Iran’s Undersea Cable Threat Tests the World’s Internet Backup Systems

Iranian security officials discussed attacking undersea internet cables if the United States and Israel renewed military strikes on Iran, Reuters reported on October 23. One official also described possible efforts to obstruct cable repairs.

TeleGeography estimates that less than 1% of international internet bandwidth passes through the Strait of Hormuz.

A disruption there would therefore affect a relatively small share of global capacity, although damage to regional connections could interrupt services in Gulf countries that depend on those routes.

The International Telecommunication Union identified concentrated cable routes, limited alternative international connections and lengthy repair procedures as telecommunications vulnerabilities in a July 2026 assessment.

These weaknesses were documented before the Iranian threat was reported, raising questions about how much traffic operators could redirect if several connections were disrupted.

Microsoft reported in September that it had rerouted network traffic through alternative Middle Eastern connections during disruptions.

The company also announced plans to invest more than $400 million in submarine and terrestrial connectivity across the region by 2030, directing spending towards additional routes for international data traffic.

Gulf Internet Cable Networks Share Routes Despite Backup Connections

The FALCON submarine cable connects Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, with additional landing points in Iran and Iraq.

The network extends towards India and connects with routes serving the Red Sea. Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1) provides international connections through Qatar, Oman and Fujairah in the UAE, linking the region with India, Southeast Asia and European landing points in France, Italy and Greece.

Gulf Bridge International (GBI) operates submarine and terrestrial connections serving Gulf telecommunications markets. Its network includes a northern land route through Iraq towards Europe, offering an alternative to connections passing through Egypt and the Red Sea.

GBI also provides connectivity between regional data centres and international network hubs, although customers’ access to alternative routes depends on their contracted services.

SeaMeWe-6 adds another submarine system serving the region, with landing points in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Its connections extend towards Asia and Europe, increasing the number of international routes available to telecommunications operators.

Multiple cables serving the same countries do not necessarily follow geographically independent paths, particularly where they share landing facilities or maritime corridors.

GBI advertises international connectivity services ranging from 100 megabits to 100 gigabits per second, depending on the product, alongside a 99.99% availability service-level agreement.

These figures describe commercial service offerings rather than the spare network capacity available during a major disruption.

Published network information does not establish how much additional traffic Gulf operators could accommodate if several submarine connections were damaged simultaneously.

Undersea Cable Repairs Face Weeks of Delays Before Work Begins

Multiple submarine cable failures in the Red Sea disrupted internet connections between Asia and the Middle East in September 2025. Microsoft reported increased latency for some Azure customers whose traffic passed through the region.

Alternative network paths kept services running, but the company warned that normal performance might not return until the damaged cables were repaired.

The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) recorded 178 submarine cable repairs worldwide in 2025, compared with an annual average of 190.

Data presented at its 2026 plenary meeting showed an average of 23.4 days between fault notification and a repair vessel’s departure, followed by 7.7 days of transit. These intervals exclude the time required to complete repairs at sea and restore the affected connections.

Repair operators must obtain permits, arrange access to territorial waters and comply with customs and maritime regulations before undertaking work in some jurisdictions. Restrictions on vessel movements can create additional obstacles in conflict-affected waters.

The ITU and ICPC have identified these administrative requirements as barriers to timely repairs, although the available global figures do not establish how much of the average delay is attributable to each cause.

At a February 2026 summit in Portugal, representatives from more than 70 countries supported recommendations to simplify cable repair permits, improve regulatory coordination and designate government contact points for repair authorisations.

The ITU–ICPC advisory body approved its final report in July, calling for faster deployment and repair procedures. These are agreed recommendations, not evidence that participating governments have implemented the proposed changes.

Satellite and Terrestrial Networks Offer Alternatives During Cable Outages

Starlink helped maintain essential connectivity in Nome, Alaska, after a submarine fibre connection failed in January 2025. SpaceX reported that its Community Gateway kept critical infrastructure connected while weather conditions prevented repairs for several months.

The company’s 2025 progress report did not provide a specific traffic-capacity figure for the Nome deployment or identify every service supported.

Submarine cables carry more than 99% of international data traffic, according to the International Telecommunication Union. Satellite networks can provide connections when terrestrial or submarine infrastructure is unavailable, particularly for isolated communities and essential services.

The ITU’s figures do not establish that satellite systems have enough spare capacity to absorb the traffic carried by major international fibre routes.

Satellite services can also experience disruptions originating on the ground. Eutelsat’s OneWeb network suffered a 48-hour outage beginning December 31, 2024, after a software problem affected its ground infrastructure.

Eutelsat confirmed that service had been restored by January 2, 2025. The incident interrupted a satellite network without damage to the satellites themselves.

In the Middle East, Ooredoo’s international connectivity arm, OFN, signed an agreement with Iraq’s iQ Networks on October 7 to purchase multiple dark fibre pairs for a planned route towards Türkiye and Europe.

The terrestrial connection is intended to link with Ooredoo’s Fibre in Gulf (FIG) submarine cable, which is being developed with capacity of up to 720 terabits per second across 24 fibre pairs. The combined route is not yet operational and remains subject to regulatory and government approvals.

The proposed Iraqi corridor would provide another path for traffic between the Gulf and Europe, while existing terrestrial networks already offer some alternatives to Red Sea routes.

Ooredoo has not disclosed how much traffic the new connection could carry during a simultaneous failure of Gulf submarine cables, or when the full route will become available to customers.

Internet Backup Investments Face the Test of Network Independence

In February 2026, e& activated capacity from the 2Africa submarine cable at its SmartHub data centre in the United Arab Emirates. The 45,000-kilometre system connects markets across Africa, Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

The company confirmed that capacity from the completed core network had entered service locally, adding international connectivity for carriers and data-centre customers. That announcement did not establish that every planned extension, including Pearls, was operational.

A week later, e& announced that connectivity provider GNX had established a new point of presence at its Fujairah SmartHub campus. The arrangement gives GNX access to international connections serving Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Americas.

It expands the connectivity options offered at the facility, although neither company disclosed the additional backup bandwidth available during a major cable failure.

Ooredoo’s latest financial disclosure provides a separate measure of investment progress. On October 28, the company reported that construction of its Fibre in Gulf network had advanced in Qatar, the UAE and Iraq, with all undersea repeaters manufactured and survey approvals secured in six countries.

The system remains under development. Its planned connection to Iraq’s terrestrial network would give operators another route towards Europe once the necessary infrastructure and approvals are in place.

For banks processing international payments, cloud providers transferring customer data and telecommunications companies selling network capacity, the commercial importance of these investments extends beyond their advertised transmission speeds.

New landing points and fibre corridors can increase available connections, but operators still need sufficient unused bandwidth and access to routes that avoid the same vulnerable locations.

Iran’s reported threat has brought those requirements into focus. The value of the new infrastructure will ultimately depend on how much customer traffic it can carry when existing connections are lost, and how long operators can maintain service before damaged cables return to operation.